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The American Influence
on the Canadian Military,
1939-1963
J .L. Granatstein

n Armistice Day in 1927, officials of the
Canadian and United States governments
dedicated a monument at Arlington Cemetery
near Washington to commemorate the service
of those Americans who had fought with
Canadian forces before their country became a
belligerent in the Great War. The occasion,
stage-managed by Vincent Massey. Canada's
first Minister to the United States, was a
glittering ceremony featuring permanent force
infantry of the Royal Canadian Regiment and
the Royal22e Regiment in their British -pattern
scarlet tunics, as well as the pipes and drums
of the 48th Highlanders, a well-known kilted
Toronto militia regiment. Everyone was on
their best behaviour, and the occasion was a
great success. even the review of the infantry at
the White House by the taciturn, if not comatose,
President Calvin Coolidge.

O

So what? What made this visit by the RCRs
and the Vandoos to Washington so noteworthy
was that it was completely unprecedented, the
Canadians being the first units in red coats to
appear in the American capital since
Washington was burned by the British (as
retaliation for the torching of York) in 1814. 1
The undefended border and the "century of
peace" that followed the War of 1812 were
already staples of after dinner speeches in both
countries, but the military relations between
the two countries were almost non-existent.
Even during the Great War there had been little
direct cooperation, other than some limited
naval and air efforts to counter German Uboats in North American waters and minor
combined anti-Bolshevik operations during the
Allied intervention in North Russia and Siberia.
Worse still, there was some resentment in

Canada at the long delay before the U.S. entered
the war and the shrill American claims after
the Armistice that the Americans had won the
war virtually singlehanded.
Strikingly, the military staff in both
countries continued to plan for war against the
other. In Ottawa. ColonelJ. Sutherland Brown,
the Director of Military Operations and
Intelligence at National Defence headquarters
from 1920 to 1927, had the responsibility for
producing war plans. His Defence Scheme
No.1, slated to become operational in the event
of a breakdown in relations between the U.S.
and Britain, was based on the assumption that
the major threat to Canada was an invasion by
American forces. Such a threat, Brown
maintained, could best be countered by
launching Canadian "flying columns" at key
points in the United States. Brown and other
officers even undertook reconnaissance trips
to spy out their objectives and the best routes
toward them, and Brown himself avidly
collected postcards showing strategic American
locations. 2 In the U.S .. similar studies took
form at much the same time at the Army and
Navy War Colleges and at the War Plans
divisions of the two services, both as training
exercises and as contingency plans. The
American army's "Plan Red" for war with Great
Britain foresaw the occupation of Canada by
four armies with the intention to "hold in
perpetuity all . . . territories gained. . . . The
Dominion government will be abolished."
"Buster" Brown's scheme was cancelled in
1931, war with the United States seeming
utterly impossible to contemplate in Ottawa;
the U.S. plans remained on the books until
1937 and war college students did additional
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studies in 1938. 3 Until a few years before the
outbreak of the Second World War, in other
words, conflict between the North American
nations was considered a possibility for the
defence planners in Ottawa and Washington.

and November 1938 to discuss Pacific Coast
defences; and Roosevelt's pledge at Kingston,
Ontario in August, 1938 that the United States
"will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian
soil is threatened by any other empire" followed
a few days later by a reciprocal promise from
Mackenzie King. 4

I

he prospect of another world war changed
everything. The threat posed by aggressive
Nazis, Fascists, and Japanese militarists was
all too real, one that had to be faced. Hesitantly,
Canada and the United States began to come
together in their own interests. The process is
well known: President Franklin Roosevelt's
growing concern about the defencelessness of
the Canadian coasts and his increasing desire
to secure naval bases in Canada and land
access to Alaska; his regular conversations on
defence with Prime Minister Mackenzie King
after 1935; the first ever meetings of the
Canadian and U.S. chiefs of staffs in January

T

Canada went to war "at Britain's side" in
September 1939 and the U.S. remained neutral.
There was no cooperation of a military nature
between them until the disasters of May and
June 1940 drove France from the war and left
Britain all but alone in the face of Hitler's Nazi
legions. From being a minor partner in the war
effort, Canada had suddenly become Britain's
ranking ally.
But Britain was desperately weak, barely
able to defend its home islands let alone to
protect Canada. By itself Canada could not
have defended its territory against either a
German attack after Britain was occupied or a

Yanksferrying Canadian infantry in Korea, 1951 or 1952.
(NAC PA 132638)
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sudden Japanese raid on the Pacific coast. The
logic of the situation was clear and Prime
Minster Mackenzie King was quick to seize the
opportunity when President Roosevelt invited
him to a meeting at Ogdensburg, New York, in
mid-August 1940. The resulting agreement,
which included a Permanent Joint Board on
Defence (PJBD), guaranteed Canadian security
during the war and allowed the fullest possible
military support to Britain; at the same time, it
marked the establishment of a permanent
defence relationship between the two countries

Certainly, there was no doubt who was the
junior in the relationship. With a population of
just over ten million, most of its effective military
forces in the United Kingdom and with more on
the way there, Canada was a virtual supplicant,
seeking the help of the 125 million-strong
United States to defend its homeland in a world
suddenly made unaccustomedly perilous.
There was every sign ofthis in the negotiations
over a strategic defence plan for the continent
when the Americans proved to be as difficult to
deal with as the British had ever been. The

HMCS Nootka being resupplied by USS Virgo off the Korean coast. Ice cream, steaks, ammo, etc.
(NAC PA 125625)

and the real beginnings ofthe close and complex
military links that persist to the present. The
United States had definitively replaced the
United Kingdom as Canada's senior defence
partner. 5

U.S. generals' demands for unity of command
seemed to translate into complete
administrative and operational control over all
Canadian forces involved in the defence of
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North America, an aim that was partly defeated
and only with enormous difficulty. 6
Washington, for its part, resisted Canada's
efforts to establish a military mission in the
U.S. capital,? and when it sent troops into
Canada in 1942 to build a highway to Alaska,
they sometimes acted more as an army of
occupation than as allies. 8 There were also
serious difficulties in working out command
relationships with the American services
operating in Newfoundland. 9
Still, the wartime cooperation with the
United States was generally good. Some 8,864
Americans served in the Royal Canadian Air
Force during the war, and more than five
thousand continued their service after the
United States entered the war in December
1941. 10 RCAF squadrons participated in the
defence of Alaska and Canadian Army troops
shared in the re-conquest of the Aleutian
Islands.U A combined Canadian-American
unit, the First Special Service Force, saw action
in the Aleutians, Italy and France, 12 and
American army divisions served under
command of First Canadian Army at various
points during the campaign in Northwest
Europe in 1944-45. Canadaalsohadadivision
prepared for service in the invasion of Japan,
one that was to be organized on American lines
and equipped with U.S. weapons. Why? As
General A.G.L. McNaughton, the Defence
Minster at the time and always a cautious man
in dealing with the Yanks, said, "One of the
primary reasons . . . was to obtain experience
with the United States system of Army
organization and U.S. equipment in view of the
obvious necessity for the future to co-ordinate
the defence of North America .... " 13 As that
suggested, post-hostilities planners in Ottawa
clearly foresaw the increasing tension between
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., understanding that
this obliged Canada to carefully consider its
role in the defence of the continent. 14
The events of the war had marked a historic
change in Canada's place in the world.
Curiously, however, there was as yet little sign
of this in the attitudes, equipment, and training
ofthe Canadian forces. The direct influence of
the American military on their Canadian
counterparts was still relatively limited. The

methods and models for Canadian soldiers,
sailors and airmen without question remained
British in 1945.

II

B

ritain's military weakness in 1940 had
pushed Canada into its first defence
alliance with the United States. The Mother
Country would never recover its military power
in a postwar world that had room for only two
superpowers with their global reach and
massive nuclear arsenals.
Ideological
similarities and geography both made certain
that Canada's policy generally moved in tandem
with that of its neighbour, and the military
marched to a different beat in the postwar
years.
In North America, the Military
Cooperation Committee, a joint planning body
spun off from the Permanent Joint Board on
Defence, began the process of integrating
continental defences in the spring of 1946. 15
The Canadian military planners worried about
their cousins' practices and occasionally
alarmist assessments. General Guy Simonds,
arguably the most successful Canadian wartime
commander, complained in 194 7 that the
American "military authorities made plans
based entirely on potential enemy capabilities,
whereas it was the practice in Canada to take
into consideration not only capabilities but
probabilities." 16 Officers like Simonds tried to
maintain the filial links with the British forces
(Simonds even created a Regular Force regiment
of Canadian Guards when he was Chief of the
General Staff a few years later), but it was
increasingly a vain struggle as the Cold War
wore on and American power increased. 17
Signs ofthis began to be evident in the joint
Canadian-U.S. training exercises that began
in the late 1940s and even more so during the
Korean War, the first major armed struggle of
an ideologically driven era. 18 The 25th Canadian
Infantry Brigade served as part of the
Commonwealth Division in Korea for purely
practical reasons. In 1950, even though the
government had already made the decision to
switch to American-pattern equipment, the
Canadian equipment in use was still primarily
British (steel helmets, battle dress, 25-pounder
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Post-Kiska: Canadians in U.S. unifonns in Alaska.
(painting by E.J. Hughes, National Gallery of Canada No.l2956)

guns and .303 Lee-Enfield rifles, for example).
The use of U.S. equipment. the Chief of the
General Staff noted, would have required "major
changes in ... minor tactical doctrine." 19
Moreover, the inherited dogma was that
American battlefield doctrine was, as befitted a
country with a huge population, wasteful of
lives and treasure; like Britain, Canada had
few of its sons to spare. Brooke Claxton, the
Minster of National Defence, shared this
received wisdom. After a visit to Korea, where
he returned unimpressed with the American
commanders and appalled by the "lying" of
staff officers who gave the briefings, he wrote a

friend that "American expenditures of lives
and ammunition are high according to our
standards, higher than our people would be
willing to accept. "20
The Royal Canadian Navy was equally
critical of its American cousins. In his memoirs,
Admiral Jeffry Brock recalled that the fleet
signal book employed by the RCN had one code
for going into action: "Enemy in Sight. Am
Engagin." The comparable USN code translated
as "Request Permission to Open Fire on the
Enemy," something that Brock was convinced
was part and parcel "of the determined
67
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resistance of American officers to make any
move at all without the written and signed
authorization of someone senior." 21 Even so,
there was a pressing need "to share the United
States Navy's technical know-how, especially
in anti-submarine warfare weaponry." As one
commentator noted, "The coming change was
first detected in the new terminology"-the
British term "asdic" was superseded by the
American word "sonar." 22 The establishment
of NATO's Supreme Allied Command Atlantic
(SACLANT). with headquarters at Norfolk, Va.,
also meant that the RCN now had its place with
the USN and not the Royal Navy. 23
Moreover, in Korea the Canadians had
learned that not everything about the U.S.
forces was bad. Brigadier John Rockingham,

the first commander of the 25th Canadian
Infantry Brigade, paid a courtesy call on General
Horace Robertson, the Australian officer serving
in
Japan
as
Commander-in-Chief
Commonwealth forces. Robertson wanted the
Canadians to use Australian rations "as this
would be to Australia's financial advantage."
Rockingham flatly refused: "I explained that
my cooks had been trained to cook American
rations and my soldiers had become used to
them and liked them very much. "24 The RCN.
operating three destroyers in Korean waters,
found much the same thing.
"The
Commonwealth base at Kure [Japan] ... had
the right kinds of ammunition and machinery
spares for the Canadian ships," Commander
Tony German wrote. "but ... British provisions
were terrible. Canadian ration scales were

S/LAndrew Mackenzie flying USAF Sabres in Korea. He was shot down (by a U.S.jet) and taken prisoner.
(PL 52195)
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much better than RN now, but in Kure [Japan]
they mainly got tough mutton .... From the
Americans in Sasebo there was first-rate
beef.... ice cream, milk, fresh fruit and
vegetables and such magic as frozen French
fries .... "25 Armies (and navies too) march on
their stomachs and, whenever they could be
secured, the Canadians now simply refused to
march without American rations.
American equipment too was increasingly
coveted. Sometimes this was because U.S.
equipment was both more comfortable to wear,
better designed for protection, and simply more
effective than the Second World War-pattern
British material used by the Canadian forces.
For example, the steel helmet used in World
War II and Korea by British and Canadian
forces offered no cover for the back of the neck,
weighed a ton, and was so awkward that it was
almost impossible to run while wearing it. "The
less said about the present helmet the better,"
wrote one infantry battalion commander. The
American helmet, by contrast, offered better
protection and, because it had a liner that was
removable, could even be used for cooking over
an open fire in a pinch. No Canadian wept
when the U.K. helmet was scrapped in the late1950s. Even the Americans' mess tins, eating
utensils and cup were better designed than the
comparable Canadian equipment issued to
soldiers in the field. 26
This desire for American equipment was
especially evident at the expensive end-aircraft
and missiles. The sky-high costs of developing
technologically sophisticated weapons systems
were driving smaller nations out of the market.
Canada's experience with the Avro Arrow fighter
aircraft is too well known to need comment, 27
but even larger powers like Britain were having
their problems in paying the bills. For the U.K.
that meant abandoning efforts to develop
missile systems of its own. For Canada, the
logic of the calculus of expenditures was equally
clear. As General Charles Foulkes, the powerful
Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee,
told the Minister of National Defence in 1958,
"It appears apparent that we are reaching a
stage in Canada where it will not be possible for
us to develop and produce further complicated
weapons purely for Canadian use .... " That
meant, he said, that "the defence of North

America will have to depend upon the joint
development and production of these weapons
and weapon systems for our joint use." 28
In fact, even that was a hope, certainly not
a certainty. The best Canada could expect was
to purchase American air-to-air missiles,
Bomarc surface-to-air missiles and aircraft
liketheCF-101 Voodoo, theCF-104Starfighter,
the CF -5 Freedom Fighter, the CP-140 Aurora,
the Boeing 707 and others under schemes that
often saw parts built in Canada or offsets for
Canadian industry included in the deal.
American equipment was not always the very
best available, but it was invariably close to it.
Moreover, in contrast to the increasingly
impecunious Canadian and British armed
services, the United States military had the
goods of modern warfare in lavish profusion, 29
and the officers and men of the Canadian
Forces inevitably and understandably wanted
their small share of it. In effect, this equipment
envy, this military amour-propre, was often a
driving force for policy.
No where was this more true than in the
Royal Canadian Air Force. Even before the
NORAD agreement formally integrated the air
defence systems of the U.S. and Canada in
1957, the RCAFwas already tightly linked with
the USAF on both a personal and a professional
level. 30 "The two air forces," Joseph Jackel
wrote of the early 1950s,

came to see the air defence of North America more
and more as a problem to be tackled jointly with
resources that were becoming more and more
intertwined. Direct and permanent links were forged
between the two air defence commands, by-passing
the more formal channels of communication .... 31

He added that the

two air forces had every reason to cooperate. They
were faced with a common military threat. As airmen,
they shared an outlook which created a similar
identity and even an emotional bond. They were
interested in convincing civilians of the danger to the
continent. Both . . . were locked in struggles with
their sister services for defence funds. Finally, for
the RCAF, the USAF was a source of funding for radar
stations and a source of pressure on Ottawa to
recognize the importance of air defence. 32
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Leonard Johnson, who retired as a majorgeneral, put it more succinctly: "The U.S. Air
Force was a big and powerful cousin with
whom we identified. "33 Moreover, until the
early 1970s in NATO, Canadian airmen served
with the Americans, unlike the army brigade
which operated in the British sector of West
Germany. 34 And because the Canadian aviation
industry (even after the cancellation of the
Arrow) was relatively well developed, much
more so than was necessary to support
Canada's relatively small air force needs, export
sales to the United States were essential. That
gave the airmen a community of interest with
the industry and both an effective joint lobby
with the government. 35 The result from the
early 1950s onwards was that the RCAF
received the lion's share of the defence budget
and the greatest influence on defence policymaking.36
This became especially apparent when the
Conservative government of John Diefenbaker
decided in 1959 to arm the Canadian Forces
with nuclear weapons. The RCAF would have
nuclear missiles for its aircraft flying in defence
of Canada, a nuclear ground attack role for its
CF-1 04s serving in NATO, and nuclear-armed
Bomarc missiles at two bases in Ontario and
Quebec. By 1960, however, the government
began to waver in its commitment to nuclear
weapons and, some might say, in its support
for Canada's alliances. One obvious sign of
this came during the Cuban missile crisis of
1962 when Diefenbaker resisted the entreaties
of his Defence minister and delayed putting
Canada's NORAD aircraft on alert. The
Americans were justifiably furious, but in fact
the aircraft had been surreptitiously prepared
for war, the Defence Minister informally
authorizing the action, and every fighter aircraft
being armed and put on readiness. 37
The RCAF was not alone in going to war
readiness. The Royal Canadian Navy cancelled
leaves and put every ship it had (in 1962, it had
some!) to sea, relieving the United States Navy
of responsibility for a critical sector of the
Western Atlantic. One authoritative account
summarized the reasoning of Admiral Kenneth
Dyer, in command on the East coast: "North
America was under direct immediate threat.
That included Canada. All the long-standing

arrangements and government-to-government
agreements said if one partner boosted its
defence [readiness] condition, the other
followed." When Ottawa did nothing, Dyer
simply acted. His relationship with his U.S.
NATO commanders at SACLANT had been
formed over the years in countless NATO
exercises and was so close and so trusting, his
assessment of the Soviet threat so fearful, that
he felt obliged to put to sea to assist his ally.
"That "band of brothers," Nelson's basic way of
running things at sea, by mutual understanding
and a firm grasp of the basic aim," Commander
Tony German wrote, "was alive and well in
North America in 1962. The navy ... honoured
Canada's duty to stand by her North American
ally. . . . "38 Even if the Prime Minister had
wished otherwise.
This same attitude, this putting of the
service's assessment of the threat and its
particular needs ahead of government policy,
was even more apparent in the next few months.
Badly battered by its ineptitude during the
Cuban crisis, the government was now about
to be brought down by its anti-Americanism
and its reluctance to arm the Bomarc missiles
it had secured with the nuclear warheads they
needed to become effective. A key player in the
process was Wing Commander Bill Lee, the
head of RCAF public relations in Ottawa. Lee
had graduated at the top of his class from the
USAF Public Relations School ("renowned as
one of the leading institutions in its field," Paul
Hellyer, Defence Minister after 1963, wrote). 39
Now Lee, other RCAF officers, and USAF senior
officers worked together to lobby the media
against the Diefenbaker policy and in favour of
nuclear weapons. As Lee admitted later, "It
was a flat-out campaign, because Diefenbaker
was not living up to his commitments. Roy
Sleman [Canadian Deputy Commander of
NORAD] was going bananas down in Colorado
Springs. We identified key journalists, business
and labour people, and key Tory hitters in
Toronto, and some Liberals, too, and flew them
out to NORAD. It was very effective." So it was,
as the American view of the defence needs of
the North American continent was put forcefully
and clearly to key Canadian opinion makers,
not least by Air Marshal Sleman and Wing
Commander Lee. Significantly, Lee's campaign
had the full support of his superiors, he says,
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the Air Council having authorized it, and the
Chief of the Air Staff having secured the
permission of the Chairman of the Chiefs of
StaffCommittee,AirChiefMarshalFrankMiller.
"You go ahead," Lee quotes Miller. "Just don't
tell me the details. "40 The campaign worked,
undoubtedly helped mightily by Diefenbaker's
incompetence.
In February 1963 the
government was defeated in Parliament over
its nuclear policy. 41 Within a few months, the
incoming Liberal government had accepted the
nuclear weaponry.
The significance of this affair and the Cuban
missile crisis ought to be clear. The military in
Canada in the past had occasionally disagreed
with government policy and made known its
feelings to the media. That was certainly true
during the conscription crisis of 1944, to cite
only one example. But these issues in 1962
and 1963 were different, directly involving as
they did the policies of a foreign government
and its armed services. Whether the actions of
John Diefenbaker were malign, stupid, or
simply wrong-headed, his administration had
been duly and properly elected and was entitled
to expect the armed forces to put the Canadian
government's policy interests ahead of those of
the United States. The military's defence
undoubtedly would be that they were doing
just that. But in fact, over the years, what had
happened was that the formal and informal
links between the Canadian and American
military-the transgovernmental relations, as
political scientists call them-had grown so
close that the senior officers placed their service
interests and their assessment of the situation
ahead oftheir government's. As Jocelyn Ghent
put it, "the Canadian military perceived and
acted on a threat that was defined not by their
government, but by the transgovernmental
group to which they felt much closer, the
Canadian-American military. "42
Probably this had been inevitable. No
small country living cheek-by-jowl with a
superpower could expect to retain full military
independence and especially not if it were
entwined in defence, economic, and political
alliances to the extent Canada and the U.S.
were. Still, the impropriety of these actions is
evident, and their effect on civil-military
relations in Canada has never been confronted

or even acknowledged by the political
leadership. So far as is known, no attempt was
ever made to impede or reverse the
entrenchment of the transgovernmental
linkages that pushed Canadian policy far ahead
of the government's wishes in 1962 or that
helped to bring down a government in 1963; no
serious or sustained effort was made to reverse
or even check the Americanization of the armed
forces. Indeed, the process of unification,
launched by Defence Minister Paul Hellyer in
the mid-1960s with the intention, among other
things, of giving Canada distinctive military
forces, may have speeded the trend by dealing
a killing blow to the Army's system of corps and
its distinctive and much loved uniforms,
buttons and badges. The army had been the
least Americanized of the forces before the
mid-1960s, 43 proud ofits regiments and their
traditions. The dark green uniform that came
with unification homogenized the Canadian
military and weakened the land forces'
psychological defences against Americanization. The budget cuts of the Trudeau
and Mulroney years and the sometimes slavish
adherence of the latter government to
Washington's policy have effectively completed
the process. If Quebec becomes independent
in the 1990s and if the Canadian Forces in
consequence abandon their bilingualism, there
will be very little remaining other than Canada's
self-professed expertise in United Nations
peacekeeping to differentiate the military forces
of the two countries.
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